The Modi government is understood to have given the army, its
diplomats and its spooks a cautious go-ahead for some kind of
calibrated, but not brash, response to the Pakistan-backed terrorist
attack in Uri, which killed 18 soldiers. Nothing wrong with this, but it
will achieve little. None of this has worked in the past, and none of
this will amount to much beyond political optics even now or in the
future. This is because underlying all this is a reactive approach, and
hence our actions can be easily anticipated by the world’s original
Islamic State, aka Pakistan.
The truth is countering Pakistan’s
death-by-a-thousand cuts terror policy needs a long-term strategy, not a
tactical reaction to events. But despite have seen over three decades
of Pakistani perfidies, we do not have a coherent strategy. If we had
one, by now the costs of Uri could have been clear to Pakistan. That we
are still debating what to do, with media speculating on options loudly,
means Pakistan is ready to face whatever we throw at them. Whatever we
do will thus be ineffective.
What we have been doing so far is blundering through with a non-strategy. Consider these points:
1. A sitting ducks strategy
Whether
it is terror against civilians in Jammu and Kashmir or the army, our
approach is defensive and non-purposeful. The truism is that a terrorist
has to succeed only once, while the defence has to win all the time to
be successful. While we can certainly protect our army camps and
airbases better, dealing with terrorists who have the element of
surprise with them needs a more flexible and mobile strategy, which
means creating a light, effective and disciplined commando force that
blends with the population to both feed intelligence and take direct
action against jihadis when they are discovered. Our National Security
Guards are busy protecting politicians instead of our security assets.
We need a force that works under the army or the central police forces,
but which is mobile and effective.
2. Learn-no-lessons strategy
Pakistan
constantly adapts to new conditions based on how the last one worked or
failed. When 26/11 made Pakistan a global pariah, it shifted strategy
to target the army and police, as strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney notes, but even after Pathankot we have not changed our strategy to meet this threat. This is why Uri happened.
3. The hugs-and-kisses strategy
This
is where we allow hope and naivete to trump good sense. We are always
ready to hop onto a bus to Lahore or hug a Pakistani Prime Minister when
the Pakistani army and Deep State have repeatedly demonstrated that
they are not willing to give up their enmity or terror assets.
Hugs-and-kisses are fine for global optics, but they can never
substitute for realism driven by hard power and firepower. WE don’t have
to abandon the optics or even talks, but we have to have an underlying
iron-fist-in-velvet glove strategy. We should be able to bare our fangs
whenever we choose to.
4. The outrage-and-bluster routine
Every
time there is a terror attack, we get angry as though this is the first
time we have been stabbed in the back. We demand solid responses from a
pusillanimous government, and we get promises of action. But a few
weeks later, we forget all this and are back to business-as-usual. Media
bluster and political statement-mongering will get us nowhere.
5. The playing-by-our-rules strategy
Indians
are particularly foolish to think that our opponent will play by our
rules, or ever play fair. When you are in a war of long-term attrition,
you have to know your enemy. You can’t fight with bow and arrow when the
enemy has guns. But we spend very little time asking ourselves what the
Pakistanis are going to do next, what atrocity they are going to commit
to provoke us. If we do not learn to think like the enemy, if we are
not regularly studying alternate scenarios on what the Pakistani
generals will be upto next, we are going to be surprised every time. We
need a permanent war-room under the National Security Advisor that will
constantly ask itself what it would do if it were in the ISI’s or
Pakistani army’s shoes, and prepare for that eventuality. We might still
get surprised, but at least we can learn from our mistakes. War is not a
play-by-my-rules affair. You have to make your rules only after
understanding what rules the opponent follows. Your rules depend on
knowing your enemy.
6. The dossier strategy
Every
time there is a terror event, we build dossiers on Pakistan’s
involvement. Nothing wrong in this, but we have to understand who or
what this dossier is for. It is to show the world, and build a domestic
case for trials in case the persons named happen to get caught in India.
Giving these dossiers to Pakistan is like giving them ultimate
pleasure. They will dismiss it as “literature” and throw it in the
dustbin and then ask for more evidence. Nothing pleases the Pakistanis
more than to let us do all the work and then throw it into the trash
can. Why are we doing this repeatedly?
7. The diplomatic isolation gambit
Once
again, this is useful in order to build global opinion against
Pakistan. We should continue doing so, and also repeatedly brand
Pakistan as the oldest and most dangerous version of Islamic State.
ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has no nuclear weapons. It
can be bombed out of existence. Pakistan cannot. So the purpose of
diplomacy should be to make Pakistan a pariah, but it won’t reduce
terrorism from Pakistani soil. The only country which has leverage over
China is Pakistan, but China is happy to covertly support Pakistani
terror in order to keep us permanently off balance. If at all diplomacy
is to work, our strategy should be to drive a wedge between China and
Pakistan by giving the former evidence of terrorism against China being
plotted by Pakistani jihadis.
8. The turn-the-other-cheek strategy
This
is pure stupidity, and entirely homegrown. Our media will keep telling
us that India as the big brother must tolerate some Pakistani perfidy,
and even provide justification for it, by showing how Pakistanis are
good people, who even pay for visiting journos’ lunch. It is true that
civil society people can be warm towards Indians, but it is not
Pakistani civil society that we are fighting with. It is the army and
ISI. Turning the other cheek and playing benevolent big brother to the
Deep State is not an option.
9. The look-at-root-causes strategy
This
also masquerades as the look-at-our-own-mistakes strategy. Or
we-brought-it-on-ourselves rationalisation. Doves in the media and
analysts will routinely tell us that we goofed in J&K, and that
Pakistan would not find traction if we only won the Kashmiris over.
While it can be no one’s claim that we did all the right things in
Kashmir, it is rubbish to suggest that the current wave of violence is
all our own doing. Remember, Pakistan was a key player in Islamising the
Valley and played an active role in the ethnic cleansing of the
Pandits. Once the Valley became 100 percent Muslim, Kashimiryat
was over. Where earlier Pakistan had to send jihadis over, now jihad is
home-grown with a self-radicalising population which thinks Islamism is
the answer. De-radicalisation should be our goal, but we still have to
fight Pakistan in this battle.
10. The good boy strategy
India
seems keener to get good certificates of tolerance and restraint from
the global community than to protect its strategic interests in Jammu
and Kashmir and elsewhere. Many Indian media writers feed this narrative
by saying India should not support war-mongering. Anyone demanding
effective action against Pakistani terror can be dubbed a warmonger, and
we keep fighting shy of this tag. The fact is every nation has a duty
to protect its interests, and retaliation against terror is not
war-mongering. A rising global power cannot decide its actions based on
what other people will think. We can explain our point of view to the
world cogently, but we cannot let them decide what is in our interests,
even if they think less of us in the bargain. The US, Russia, China,
Israel, UK and no country worth its salt decides on strategic actions
based on what the world will think. We should not either.
Our real
problem is this: there is something in the Indian cultural DNA that
shies away from conflict, avoids hard decisions, and offers a
rationalisation for inaction and cowardice. Not standing up to a regular
bully is passed off (by us) as some kind of peace-loving Indian
attitude when internally we are seething with anger over repeated
humiliations by a terrorist nation.
The Pakistanis have figured
this out about us, which is why they target us with impunity, knowing
how we will respond. Isn’t it time we showed them we can be different?
We owe it to ourselves and the future of Indian nationhood to show them
we are not what they think we are: sissies afraid to stand up for our
national interests.
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